Problem Description
In slot auctions for L2s and in zk-prover markets, the right to validate, sequence, or prove data correctness must be assigned to third parties in a permissionless way. Theoretical and empirical studies, including analyses of MEV-Boost auctions, show that these allocation processes often concentrate market power. Such concentration can create negative externalities, notably multi-block MEV and monopolistic pricing for block building or zk-proofs, which in turn reduce efficiency and fairness.
The challenge is to design mechanisms that allocate these rights while ensuring broader distribution and stronger fairness in a permissionless environment.
More formally:
- What is the most natural way to formalise distribution or decentralisation when bidders have heterogeneous valuations for the item or set of items?
- Does a proportional-allocation rule (for example, a Tullock contest or proof-of-stake mechanism) deliver the strongest decentralisation in equilibrium, or can other mechanisms do better?
Related Notes
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